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LAWYERS IN AMERICA: A
PROFESSION IN SEARCH
OF DIRECTION
PAUL L. SAVAGE*
RICHARD A. GABRIEL**
The law and its chief practitioners, the members of the legal profes-
sion, are in trouble. That the profession's public image is worsening is
virtually beyond debate, and that the public conduct of some of 4ts mem-
bers could get no worse is certainly beyond question. Even a cursory exami-
nation of the events of the last few years suggests that something is seri-
ously wrong with the practice of law in America. Consider the following
events, all of which have occurred in less than a decade: a public official
of a large city issues an order to "shoot to maim;"' a series of political trials
is undertaken against opponents of the Vietnam war based upon the most
spurious conspiracy statute ever to confound American jurisprudence; 2
high-level cabinet officials are convicted of illegal activity; ' a Vice Presi-
dent is forced to resign;4 and to cap it all, a President of the United States
is forced by public indignation to resign in the face of evidence imputing
gross violations of the civil law and moral code of the Republic.5 What most
of the individuals involved in these circumstances had in common was not
* Professor of Political Science, Saint Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire; B.A.,
University of Connecticut, 1949; M.A., Lehigh University, 1962; Ph.D., University of Massa-
chusetts, 1970.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, Saint Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hamp-
shire; A.B., Providence College, 1964; M.A., University of Rhode Island, 1966; Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, 1969.
See N.Y. Times, April 16, 1968, at 30, col. 3.
2 See, e.g., id., Apr. 10, 1969, at 28, col. 1 (Chicago Seven conspiracy trial for disruptive
conduct at the 1968 Democratic National Convention); id., Oct. 8, 1968, at 13, col. 1 (trial of
Catonsville Nine for burning draft board files with homemade napalm).
See United States v. Haldeman, No. 75-1381 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 12, 1976) (en banc).
See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1, cols. 7-8, where it is reported that former Vice President
Spiro T. Agnew pleaded nolo contendere to a federal charge that he failed to report certain
income received while Governor of Maryland in connection with illegal kickbacks in return
for political favors. See also Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811
(1974) (Agnew disbarred).
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1974, at 1, cols. 7-8 (President Nixon resigns amidst preparation
for impeachment trial). See also In re Nixon, 53 App. Div. 2d 178, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1st Dep't
1976) (disbarment of former President Nixon).
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only their public office, but also, and more significantly, their membership
in the legal profession. Due to their position as sworn officers of the court,
their acts assume a far different character than those of the ordinary law-
breaker.' As members of the legal profession, American lawyers have al-
ways laid claim to a special position in our democratic society. The erosion
of their ethical standards both reflects and contributes to an erosion of the
legitimacy of the political system itself. Like Caesar's wife, attorneys must
be above all suspicion of guilt - and they have failed to be so.
The events surrounding the final resolution of Watergate merely de-
monstrated publicly what the interested observer had begun to suspect
some time ago, namely, that the members of the legal profession are slow-
ly losing their moral bearings and that the profession itself is no longer
able-perhaps even unwilling-to discipline its members and to take
collective responsibility for their actions.' When the process of disintegra-
tion began is unimportant; that it is rapidly proceeding unabated in full
view of the American populace is all important. Why, in light of the Ameri-
can public ethos, is the legal profession suffering this decline? What factors
' The attorney's special relationship with the law has engendered an expectation that he will
maintain the highest standards of conduct in both his professional and private life. See G.
SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 168, 169 (1844), quoted in Maryland State Bar Ass'n v.
Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 547, 318 A.2d 811 (1974). This standard has, to some extent, been
adopted in disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., In re Calhoun, 127 Vt. 222, 245 A.2d 560 (1968)
(per curiam), wherein disciplinary action was deemed necessary because an attorney's viola-
tion of the law is not only a failure "to perform a duty imposed by law on . . . citizens
generally," but moreover, because "it is a breach of responsibility that tends to discredit the
legal profession .... " Id.
I In 1970, the American Bar Association published a report documenting deficiencies in
lawyer discipline in the United States. See Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, Report, 95 A.B.A. REP. 783, 797-98 (1970). The Special Committee concluded:
With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforce-
ment ranges from apathy to outright hostility. Disciplinary action is practically nonex-
istent in many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many discipli-
nary agencies have little power to take effective steps against malefactors.
Id. at 797. The Committee also found that
lawyers fail to report violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility committed
by their bretheren, much less conduct that violates the criminal law; that lawyers will
not appear or cooperate in proceedings against other lawyers but instead will exert
their influence to stymie the proceedings; that in communities with a limited attorney
population disciplinary agencies will not proceed against prominent lawyers or law
firms and that, even when they do, no disciplinary action is taken, because the mem-
bers of the disciplinary agency simply will not make findings against those with whom
they are professionally and socially well acquainted; and that, finally, state discipli-
nary agencies are undermanned and underfinanced, many having no staff whatever for
the investigation or prosecution of complaints.
Id. at 797-98. Thus, while exact figures are not available, it seems fair to suggest that bar
associations across the country have been less than anxious to disbar or even censure their
members in substantial numbers.
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contributed to and continue to contribute to the erosion of ethical stan-
dards and professional trust? Certainly the necessary conditions did not
evolve overnight, but rather must have been the culmination of a long and
even tortuous process of development. It is the purpose of this Article to
examine the conditions which appear responsible for the erosion of ethical
standards in the legal profession and to assess the means available to
reverse the trend towards transforming this profession into a moral
laughingstock. For in the end, no republic which regards its lawyers with
contempt and suspicion-however well deserved-can long remain law
abiding. Indeed, it can barely remain free; it can never remain just.'
Any attempt to understand the behavior of the lawyer in contempo-
rary America must begin with a simple proposition: the American legal
profession has undergone a rather curious pattern of sociopolitical develop-
ment when compared with the legal professions of other Anglo-Saxon de-
mocracies.' It is this developmental process that has shaped much of the
ethical perspectives and behavioral patterns demonstrated by lawyers
today. The pull of history is indeed strong and its effects far reaching.
Certainly, the understanding that the American legal system and the place
of lawyers as its chief practitioners are categorically different from those
of other contemporary democracies is a basic realization necessary to com-
prehend the nature of America's legal profession. In brief, American con-
ceptions of the state, the economy, and the social order are radically differ-
ent from European conceptions. At base, that difference revolves about the
fact that Europeans have long taken it as axiomatic that the state, the
economy, and the social order require some form of direction if anything
but chaos is to result. Thus, the rise of socialist doctrine, for example, was
a peculiarly European phenomenon. American social thought has placed
itself at the opposite pole. Deeply engrained in American ideology is the
premise that the social order, the economic order, and the political order
are indeed self-regulating. It is from this difference in perspective that the
conditions which have shaped the ethical and behavioral patterns of the
American lawyer have sprung.
Consider the argument that the political order itself is self-regulating.
The court in Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974),
emphasized the profession's pivotal role in the legal system, stating:
The administration of justice under our adversary system largely depends upon the
public's ability to rely on the honesty of attorneys who are placed in a position of being
called upon to conduct the affairs of others both in and out of court.
Id. at 547, 318 A.2d at 814.
' The sociopolitical development of the law and the legal profession, in both common law and
civil law countries, has been studied extensively. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(2d ed. 1968); T. BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM & MODERN JURISPRUDENCE: A WORKING
THEORY & STUDY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (1964); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM:
SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968).
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One need look no further than James Madison and his famous contribu-
tions to the Federalist Papers for justification of this position.'0 In short,
Madison argued that societies are divided into self-forming factions or
groups which tend to coalesce around similar interests. These groups then
begin to press their interests upon government in an effort to obtain for
themselves "what government has to give."" Is the group struggle to be
regulated by the government? Indeed not. The struggle for resources and
influence can be autoadjusting, since the very process of seeking advantage
will force some groups to abandon their more extreme positions and to
reconcile others. In other instances, groups will cancel each other out.
Those that do succeed in penetrating the governmental structure can ex-
pect to confront a bewildering maze of checks and balances, coupled with
a system marshalling a multiplicity of veto points designed to check the
tyranny of any single group.' Out of this continuing struggle evolves a kind
of general equilibrium. It is this equilibrium-defined as the ascendant
coalition of interests at any point in time-that comes to pass as public
policy and is identified with the public interest. 3 Since the process of
formulating such public policy is the result of "natural" forces within the
body politic, it is unnecessary for government to act as regulator, formula-
tor, or protector of the public interest. Public policy will, accordingly, form
naturally, be challenged, and eventually change, all without active inter-
vention by governmental authority." The result is a conception of the
, See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
"Id. at 52-54 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison). For a contemporary argument that the
American system is one of interlocking and frequently competing elites, see T. DYE & L.
ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS (3d
ed. 1975). The authors argue therein that the American political system rests upon the
economic interests of powerful elites. These elites are small in number, but not necessarily
conspiratorial or closed; they may even be "public-regarding." The elites are grouped by the
authors into three categories: corporate, public interest, and government. Significantly, the
authors found that 56.1% of government leaders are members of the legal profession, and that
25.8% of all leaders have law degrees. Id. at 90-98, 129-31.
" See Churchill, Socialism and Centralization of Power, in THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN
EUROPEAN THOUGHT 370 (R. Schuettinger ed. 1970). In discussing the system of checks and
counterchecks, the author notes that "Ithe scheme of the American Constitution was
framed to prevent any one man or any one lot, getting arbitrary control of the whole nation."
Id. (emphasis in original).
11 Madison's ideas are by no means in disrepute and still hold a respectable place in the
literature of the social sciences. See, e.g., D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL
INTERESTS AND POLITICAL OPINION (2d ed. 1968). See also Mitchell, Intelligence and the Guid-
ance of Economic Evolution, in AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 3,13-15 (1974). Indeed, these
authors argue that pressure groups influence policy decisions in all phases of government.
'1 For a similar analysis of the effects of interest groups on government, see Mitchell,
Intelligence and the Guidance of Economic Evolution, in AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 3
(1974). There, the author suggests that
we have seldom tried to work out national plans except when some considerable group
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political process as autoadjusting, based in competition, and in no need of
governmental planning or guidance. 5
Just as the political order does not require regulation, so too, the
economic order is perceived as being self-regulating. The adoption of the
free enterprise, capitalist system, complete with Smithian notions of an
invisible guiding hand, are so well known as to require only passing men-
tion here. Initially, it was assumed that a free and competitive market
involving a relatively large number of buyers and sellers would, through
the laws of supply and demand, ultimately regulate itself." So strongly is
this premise rooted in American mythology that even today it is mouthed
by important members of the government. There are two aspects to this
conception of self-regulation: First, it is assumed that price will control the
ebb and flow of goods in terms of both production and direction; second,
and more importantly, it is assumed that competition will result in an
equitable distribution of goods and services to all segments of the popula-
tion. Accordingly, acceptance of these assumptions negates any need for
regulation. Like the political order, the Smithian free enterprise economy
responds only to "natural" laws of economics. Attempts at regulation are
truly superfluous, and the best government is that which governs least. 7
among us has become seriously dissatisfied with the results of private enterprise or of
private enterprise as regulated by local or state governments .... And just as our
individual thinking is commonly directed toward an immediate, specific difficulty, so
most of our efforts at national planning have dealt with some single need that has been
keenly felt by groups sufficiently numerous or sufficiently powerful to command atten-
tion.
Id. at 29. Thus, Mitchell, like Madison, considers group pressure to be the fundamental
catalyst of governmental change.
11 A similar point of view has been espoused by several of this century's most prominent
leaders. See, e.g., Churchill, Socialism and Centralization of Power, in THE CONSERVATIVE
TRADITION IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT 370 (R. Schuettinger ed. 1970); Erhard, Prosperity for All,
in THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT 358, 360 (R. Schuettinger ed. 1970).
1 See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (E.
Carman ed. 1937).
'" See id. One highlight of Adam Smith's argument is his criticism of the merchantilist
doctrine, i.e., it is the duty of the statesmen to control and regulate the economic activities
of the masses. Smith contended that each individual, in his own particular situation, is a
better judge of how to expand his wealth than is the distant statesmen. See Mitchell,
Intelligence and the Guidance of Economic Evolution, in AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 3, 6
(1974). This theory has since expanded into what has become known as the doctrine of laissez
faire. For a brief history of the laissez faire doctrine, see id.
Winston Churchill espoused a view similar to that of Adam Smith. He stated:
We hold that in these modern times planning, with all the resources of science at its
disposal, should aim at giving the individual citizen as many choices as possible of
what to do in all the ups and downs of daily life. The more a man's choice is free, the
more likely it is to be wise and fruitful, not only to the chooser but to the community
in which he dwells.
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Finally, the social order also is considered to be self-regulating. The
adoption, virtually intact, of the notions of Adam Smith, Charles Darwin,
and Herbert Spencer make the search for anything resembling social jus-
tice logically absurd simply because such a search is patently unneces-
sary.'" In the operation of this social system, the fit survive and the unfit
do not-although this latter condition normally translates into poverty
rather than death. The entire mad scramble for survival and the resulting
pecking order are purportedly governed by natural laws rooted heavily in
a pseudobiology. In the end, the result in this area, like the result in the
political and economic spheres, is the same, i.e. the need for some form of
regulation in pursuit of social justice-defined here minimally in terms of
mitigating at least the extremes of wealth and poverty-is dismissed as
superfluous.
The framers of other democracies in the western world took an entirely
different view than the one which was eventually adopted in America. This
was especially the case in England, the birthplace of socialism as well as
free enterprise and Social Darwinism. Generally, the regulation of the
political, social, and economic order was, in the European analysis, both
proper and necessary to avoid social chaos and mass injustice. This view,
coupled with the rise of legal positivism as a philosophy (law as the dic-
tates of the state as opposed to the affirmation of natural laws), clearly
leads directly to the conclusion that the primary mechanism for controlling
the economy, the society, and the political system should be the law. Now,
when one speaks of the law as a mechanism for control, what is ultimately
being suggested is that law be used to mitigate the effects of the social and
economic process as they would operate if left unregulated.'" Accordingly,
Churchill, Conservative or Socialist Planning?, in THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN EUROPEAN
THOUGHT 372 (R. Schuettinger ed. 1970).
11 The application of Darwinian biological arguments, see C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES
BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (1859), to human societies can be found in H. SPENCER,
SOCIAL STATICS OR ORDER TOGETHER WITH MAN VERSUS THE STATE (2d rev. ed. 1915). Actually,
Spencer preceeded Darwin's work by almost 9 years. Once Darwin had made the results of
his study known, however, the Spencerian argument was able to draw upon a body of "scien-
tific fact" for support, thus quickly enlarging its believability.
Of course, the American socioeconomic system and the legal system are not totally
unregulated, since neither Smith nor Spencer provide anything close to an adequate model
for our technological society. Although many interests are regulated, some interests are more
regulated than others, and some are regulated to their greater self-advantage. For instance,
the American Medical Association does not restrict the number of doctors in the interests of
better medicine, but rather in the interests of greater income for doctors. Similarly, although
the legal profession is self-regulated, this is not necessarily done in the pursuit of justice, but
may be directed at the goals of income and prestige. So it is with special interest legislation;
such laws protect these interests in direct proportion to their power. Accordingly, the Federal
Energy Administration is manned by oil executives and the legal system by lawyers who
protect the interests which can pay them.
,1 For an account of the development of economic thought in England, from its beginnings
LAWYERS IN AMERICA
such a perspective necessitates the construction of some notion of just what
political, economic, and social justice should entail. Once the law is har-
nessed to these conceptions, the law and its practitioners become the pri-
mary mechanisms for achieving political, economic, and social justice.
This view of the law never took solid root in the American mind for the
simple reason that the affirmation of existing natural laws governing poli-
tics, society, and the economy made it superfluous. Thus, any comparison
between European and American systems of law and the respective posi-
tions of their legal professions must recognize this basic difference: in
America the law was never conceived as an agent for achieving social
justice and its practitioners have never been expected to pursue such "un-
necessary" ends.2"
If, as has been argued, law in the United States is not perceived as a
mechanism for both defining the public good and achieving that public
good through its application, is it a fair question to ask just what role the
American lawyer is supposed to play? If he is not an agent of social regula-
tion aimed at achieving social justice, then what is he? In response to the
implicit tension extant within the modern democracy, the lawyer, both
American and European, has stressed his dual role as an officer of the court
and an advocate of his client. That such roles may come into conflict is
all too obvious.2' Indeed, the way in which such conflicts are typically
resolved is important in defining the American legal profession's develop-
ment and distinguishing it from its European counterpart.
Focusing for the moment on the lawyer's role as an officer of the court,
it seems clear that such a role is consistent with the position that law and
its agents ought to be active mechanisms for achieving and defining social
justice. This role, in turn, is certainly most consistent with the European
view that social, economic, and political orders are not autoadjusting in
terms of either processes or ends. Accordingly, the lawyer who tends to
stress his role as servant of the court is virtually flying in the face of those
as laissez faire through its transformation into active social control, see G. SABINE, A HISTORY
OF POLITICAL THEORY 635-680 (4th ed. 1973).
" The identification of American law with the client-advocate role, especially as it pertains
to defending the commercial interests of the client, is reflected in the fact that the British
practice of "reading law" was quickly abandoned in America in favor of the "law school."
The law school idea is essentially based on a notion of technocracy and is an offshoot of the
business ethic and the predominance of business influence in the American scene. Indeed, it
was the business community that first financed the professional school movement. See D.
WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 5 (1948).
Z1 The American Bar Association has recognized the conflict inherent in a lawyer's dual role.
See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY CANON 7. The Code states that "[tihe
duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law." Id. EC 7-19.
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forces largely responsible for shaping the American public ethos. In fact,
the American notions of a self-regulating sociopoliticoeconomic order is far
more consistent with the lawyer's alternative role as defender of his client
and his client's interests. Viewed in this light, it is hardly surprising to note
that lawyers in the United States have found it convenient to stress their
role as client advocates rather than as defenders of the public interest or
even as servants of the law.2 In short, the very public ethos associated with
social development in the United States strongly militates against a lawyer
emphasizing his role as officer of the court and servant of the law. Self-
adjusting public orders negate the need for adjustors. In the nature of
things, this can be a very agreeable position for the individual attorney who
may, as an officer of the court, cloak himself in the mantle of the law while
neglecting the ethical responsibilities of such a position. Thus, he can
operate to great advantage in his advocate role while paying only lip ser-
vice to the duty inherent in his position as officer of the court.
Given what has been said to this point, the argument lends itself to
the interpretation that the direction of the legal profession, as well as its
choice of roles, is directly related to and is probably a result of those greater
underlying forces which historically have shaped the American public
ethos. The doctrines of indeterminate government based in the struggle of
private interest groups, economic laissez faire, and Social Darwinism have
all contributed to the general ethos of the United States; the legal profes-
sion has adopted this ethos in much the same way as any other group in
our society.23 When viewed in the aggregate, this development can hardly
be termed beneficial. Denied the appropriate philosophical background
against which to act out their role as servant of the court, lawyers appar-
ently have stressed their role as advocate of client interests and have begun
to view the law and its application primarily as a means of economic
advancement. Such a position is starkly logical. Any self-regulating society
provides little opportunity for pursuers of social justice. It does provide
ample justification, however, for profitably furthering the system of
interest-group politics, secure in the naive belief that the pursuit of a
multiplicity of private interests will result in an equilibrium equivalent to
the public interest.24 In the end, a lawyer becomes just one more seller in
the market place, offering his skills to the highest bidder.
" For a discussion of the lawyer's advocate role, see Thode, The Ethical Standard for the
Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REV. 575, 584 (1961).
13 See Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 RocKY MT. L. REV. 405, 410
(1953).
11 As naive as the notion may be, we Americans tend to believe rather strongly in the myth
that a multiplicity of interests placed in competition will eventually produce something called
the public interest. See generally Schubert, "The Public Interest" in Administrative
Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory?, 51 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 346 (1957).
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To the extent that the argument advanced thus far is correct, it would
seem reasonable to expect the bulk of the more successful lawyers, espe-
cially those who have been practicing for sometime, to be employed in the
area of "financial" law. By financial law is meant that area of the law
which pertains to various aspects of commerce. Thus, securities, banking,
and tax lawyers, corporate lawyers, insurance lawyers and general corpora-
tion lawyer-lobbyists would fall into this category. In contrast, one would
expect to find only a relatively small number of attorneys, most probably
recent graduates of law school, engaged in the practice of "social" law, that
is, law concerned with the attempt to help relatively powerless individuals
or groups achieve some sort of "fair share" of the system's output. 5 This
category includes public defenders, rent lawyers, consumer advocates, and
the like. Clearly, financial law corresponds closely to the lawyer's role as
client advocate, while social law is far more consistent with the philosophi-
cal and ethical justifications underpinning the role of the attorney as an
officer of the court.
In the absence of definitive empirical data, this suggestion cannot be
proven conclusively. Yet, even a cursory examination of the legal system
reflects the sad shape of the public defender system, the general lack of
criminal lawyers available in most areas of the country, the difficulty and
at times inability of the poor to secure competent counsel 26 an overloaded
court system which virtually denies justice by delaying it, while making
such delays profitable for the lawyers involved, the scandalous condition
of probate procedures which encourage rather than discourage challenges
to one's final testament, all to the profit of the attorney involved, and a
multitude of other abuses too commonly recognized to need mentioning.
All of this suggests that the social law aspects of the legal profession have
been sadly neglected.2 7 In any event, the perception of the lawyer as a
5 The search for monetary gains and a prestigous practice has indeed drawn many of the
more competent lawyers away from the practice of criminal law and into more "suitable
arenas for distinguished counsel." Foster, Lawmen, Medicine Men and Good Samaritans, 52
A.B.A.J. 223, 225 (1966). This trend is so noticeable that it has been argued that the "mino-
rity practitioner is the major agent and representative of the organized Bar vis-A-vis poor
people," and that there are numerous "ways in which the organized Bar has failed the ghetto
poor," the class of people most in need of the criminal lawyer. Clark, The Minority Lawyer:
Link to the Ghetto, 55 A.B.A.J. 61 (1969). At least one major factor contributing to the trend
away from the practice of criminal law has been the growth of the large corporations and the
concomitant large fees which a competent attorney can extract from them. See, e.g., Gossett,
The Corporation Lawyer's Social Responsibilities, 60 A.B.A.J. 1517 (1974). See also Brennan,
The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 54 A.B.A.J. 121 (1968); White, Human Dimen-
sions of Wall Street Fiction, 58 A.B.A.J. 175 (1972).
"' See note 25 supra.
" See Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 927 (1966); Clark, The Minority Lawyer: Link to The Ghetto, 55 A.B.A.J. 61 (1969);
Kirgis, Law Firms Could Better Serve the Poor, 55 A.B.A.J. 232 (1969); Report of the Ameri-
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servant of the economically and socially powerful is clearly well rooted in
the popular mind. Hence, in light of the American public ethos, it is hardly
surprising to discover a substantial proportion of the legal profession, in-
cluding the most financially successful attorneys, practicing in those areas
actually designed to enable powerful interest groups to press their de-
mands upon the political system in true Madisonian fashion. To note this
condition is to note the emphasis extant within the legal profession: a
manifest tendency to follow the powerful and rich in the hope of acquiring
personal power and wealth.2" This path leads inevitably into commercial
activities of one sort or another. It cannot lead towards a concern for social
justice attainable through use of law as a regulatory force. It cannot so lead
because the public ethos supporting the commercial bias of the law is one
which regards the task of defining, pursuing, and safeguarding the public
interest as unnecessary as well as unprofitable.
This argument is not intended to give the impression that the empha-
sis evident in the legal profession is a result of inevitable forces over which
no control is possible. To be sure, lawyers, like everyone else, are heirs to
historical precedent and tradition. Nonetheless, the actual practices of the
profession during any period contributes to the precedents used in the
future. Consequently, continued professional emphasis upon the client-
advocate role is as significant a factor in defining the perspectives and
practices of the legal profession as is the weight of tradition. In short, this
professional emphasis has obscured the need for the bar to develop and
overtly support a professionally derived view of the public interest. In-
stead, the more narrow view of client interest has historically been given
priority. This development should not be a surprise; since the law was
never intended to be a mechanism of social justice in America, it is not
startling to discover that, as a profession, lawyers have failed to develop a
coherent conception of what the public interest should be. The implica-
tions of this failure border on the ominous.
Members of the legal profession have always laid claim to a special
position in democratic society. Like members of the medical profession,
lawyers advance the argument that the inordinate amount of social pres-
tige rendered to them is a proper reflection not merely of their economic
achievement, but primarily of the nature of their being special practition-
ers of arts vital to the society." While the medical doctor's special claim
can Assembly on Law and the Changing Society, 54 A.B.A.J. 450 (1969); Shriver, Law Reform
and the Poor, 17 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1967).
"I An examination of the number of Congressmen who hold law degrees revealed that in 1973,
63% of all Senators and 48% of Representatives were lawyers. No other western democracy
so places its lawyers in positions of public power. See T. DYE & L. ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF
DEMOCRACY: AN UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITIcs 322 (3d ed. 1975).
" See Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 405 (1953). In
classifying the law as "a harmonizing and unifying force" in our society, the author reasons
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rests upon his purported ability to deal with the question of life or death,
the lawyer's claim to special prestige has been based upon his role as
servant of the law. Indeed, the special position of the members of the legal
profession has been enshrined in sacred cows such as the attorney-client
relationship, a privileged sanctuary which may actually obstruct the pro-
cess of justice. Members of the bar have claimed a position which is justi-
fied largely by the assertion that they fulfill an essential function in so-
ciety.
Even accepting this argument for a special position, one immediately
encounters the dismal ethical practices which contradict the lawyer's
claims of privilege. Because they have deemphasized their role as officers
of the court while stressing their role as client advocates, it is hard to see
how they differ from any other special interest group in our society. Lack-
ing a truly moral-philosophical basis for being special practitioners, it
would appear that the stressing of the client-advocate role coupled with
the growing emphasis on the practice of financial law has transformed the
legal profession into little more than another interest group. Significantly,
however, this interest group promotes its own security and advancement
largely through the practice of helping the already powerful garner and
protect their prerogatives. At the same time that the lawyer claims privi-
lege as an officer of the court, he is in the enviable position of using the
law to benefit himself and the special interests which employ him. The
argument of special practitioners is here transformed into one of special
pleader. The ultimate irony is, of course, the lawyer's tendency to cloak
this self-serving emphasis in the pseudomorality of the special practi-
tioner. In the end, lawyers are fast beginning to resemble tribal shamans
who are accorded social respect and prestige beyond all proportion to the
service they perform.
If it is correct to assert that members of the legal profession have
begun to act like members of any other special interest group in our so-
ciety, it is not surprising that we increasingly find them adopting the
morality of these other groups, a morality which is essentially that of a
commercially oriented entrepreneur dedicated to the maximization of
financial gain, social power, prestige, and deference. 0 One result of this
metamorphosis is the insanity of Watergate with its ultimate irony: a
that "[w]ithout law, organized society would be impossible." He also states that "[mien
have need for more than a system of law; they have need for a system of law which functions
and that means they have need for lawyers." Id.
I This characterization is not meant to be derogatory. Indeed, the notion that groups within
the politicoeconomic arena should and do pursue the maximization of power, profit, and
prestige is basic to American, Smithian, and Social Darwinist thought. Further, we find this
premise enshrined in the "rationality" models developed by social scientists to explain the
"real" world. See A. DOWNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
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conspiracy upon the part of a group of lawyers to subvert the very law they
had all sworn to preserve, protect, and defend. Most certainly this is not
the morality so ardently professed by a legal profession doing its best to
marshall a rhetorical defense of a position from which it demands defer-
ence and respect from society at large.
But perhaps this criticism is unfair. Is it really all that bad for lawyers
to adopt the dominant ethos and morality of the business culture which
has so often been acclaimed as the hallmark of America's success in the
world? After all, social responsibility can only be expected to extend so far
and, in the end, no one works for nothing! This argument, however, is
misplaced. The fact is that irrespective of the actual behavior of its mem-
bers, much of which has been reprehensible, the legal profession continues
to cloak its activities in traditional language, demanding deference, stress-
ing legality, and insisting on respect for the law.3' The paradox is that the
justification for this deference is based in the logic of the special practi-
tioner, although the ethos of the society admits of no need for such special
practitioners and the practitioners themselves violate their special moral
position in service of the historical ethos. Moreover, the continued use of
the role of the lawyer as a court officer to justify his elevated social position
further publicly identifies the behavior of the lawyer with the legitimacy
of the law.3"
It must be noted that in the final analysis there is a significant differ-
ence between the lawyer as he is perceived by the public and the lawyer's
self-definition. The identification of the ethics of the lawyer with the ethics
of the law is but a singular manifestation of the identification of the appli-
cation of the law with the ultimate legitimacy of the state. Viewed from
this perspective, a corrupt accountant or an embezzler commits only pri-
vate crimes since his actions have little or no effect on popular perceptions
of the legitimacy of the political order. But the corrupt acts of a lawyer and
the failure of the legal profession to condemn such acts takes on the charac-
ter of a public crime insofar as a corrupt lawyer tarnishes the law itself,
and, as a result, erodes the legitimacy of the state as perceived by the
populace. Ifilegitimacy is to be accorded to the law, it must not only be
just, it must also be perceived as just. Illegal and unethical behavior by
members of the legal profession, at the very least, erodes the law and, at
worst, undermines the Republic itself.
What, then, is the conclusion? It seems proper to suggest from this
analysis that the legal profession in the aggregate has in fact lost its moral
1' See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A
Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821 (1974); Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and
Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541 (1974); Sutton, A Preview of the Proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility, 53 A.B.A.J. 901 (1967).
32 See Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821 (1974).
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bearings. Having failed to develop a conception of the public interest, it
logically stresses a role that is antithetical to the pursuit of social justice.
As a consequence, the profession accepts a role readily adapted to the
morality of the marketplace and the modern corporation while, simulta-
neously, it continues to lay claim to a privileged position in society al-
though the justification for that position is no longer evident. If lawyers
ever were special practitioners in American society their present behavior
no longer qualifies them as such, legal rhetoric and moralizing to the con-
trary notwithstanding.
Perhaps the legal profession in America has lost its moral direction
because the principles upon which it was based were incorrect to begin
with. The role of the lawyer as servant of the law, so readily accepted in
Europe, cannot be accepted if one accepts the premise that the political,
economic, and social orders are self-regulating. To reject this premise,
basic as it is to the American ethos as developed through the frontier
experience, Madisonian politics, free enterprise, and social darwinism, is
to reassert immediately the role of the lawyer as "servant of the law." In
this capacity, a lawyer's task is to see that justice is done through the
instrumentality of courts which, as even the most awkward of political
science students knows, are quite capable of acting as legislatures and
active instruments for the achievement of social justice.3 Consider the
dilemma: if the legal practitioner accepts his role as servant of the law, he
rejects the socioeconomic system which is the foundation of his privilege;
if, on the other hand, he rejects his ethical responsibilities as a legal officer,
he stands revealed as the purely economic creature he indeed appears to
be.
It is submitted that the premises supporting the current commercial
role of law are incorrect today, just as they were incorrect when first they
permeated the American social consciousness. In the final analysis, only a
fool or a madman truly believes that a complex social, economic, and
political entity such as the United States can truly be autoadjusting. To
maintain this fiction, say a hundred years ago, was perhaps tolerable. In a
modern social setting, however, to persist in this blindness borders on the
criminal. Certainly, only the modern system can truly grind down the
individual without even being aware that it is doing so and, indeed, doing
it legally.3" Accordingly, to perpetuate the commercial ethic as a means of
justifying the behavior of the legal profession is not only nonsense, but also
dangerous.
' For a discussion of the judiciary's legislative role, see G. SCHUBERT, THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
THE COURTS: JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING (1965).
" The Internal Revenue Code and its application by a powerful and largely uncontrolled
bureaucracy is a perfect example of a system th*at can trap the individual, reduce his freedom,
and penalize him-all legally and with little regard for the concept of fairness.
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What is to be done? It seems that what the members of the legal
profession must do is to begin to reaffirm their role as servants of the law
and officers of the court. They must come to realize that the doctrines of
a hundred years ago, invalid even then, are clearly inapplicable today.
There is a clear need to reaffirm the role of law as a creative force in
regulating social, economic, and political affairs in the Republic. This
reaffirmation must be combined with a new perspective toward achieving
some notion of social justice, and this, in turn, requires that the legal
profession begin its search for such a doctrine. At present, it has failed to
develop cogent and applicable ideas of what goals the law should pursue
in dealing with the often hostile poles of public and private interest. Young
lawyers must learn that the law is far more than a punitive force or a means
to the achievement of special privileges for the already powerful. For most
of society the law is the sole instrument, other than violence, with which
to achieve social justice. If those who claim to be its custodians refuse to
take up the challenge of seeking and achieving social justice, and decide
instead to emphasize its commercial aspects as the surest route to private
gain, then the public has not only been abandoned, it has been betrayed.
After all is said and done, the authors cannot help but feel that there
is a clear need for a moral renaissance in the legal profession. If it is truly
a "special and learned profession," then its social responsibilities, together
with its power and influence, are indeed greater than those of other social
groups. In the same way, its moral standards must be higher than those
of other interest groups. Our charge is that they have, as a profession, lost
their sense of moral direction. Unless they are able to reaffirm and redis-
cover this direction, acts of unethical conduct will become more frequent,
and the profession perhaps even more silent in its response to such acts.
More importantly, the legal profession does not stand alone. The lawyer
in America, whether he likes it or not, is perceived by the public as a
representative of the law. Every act of questionable conduct has a corrosive
effect on the legitimacy of the law and eventually erodes public perception
of the legitimacy of the general political order. In the end, the very founda-
tions of the state are brought into question, and down that path the Repub-
lic can find only disaster.
